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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Procedure-Standards for Valid Consent to Search
A warrantless search is reasonable under the fourth amendment
only within a few "specifically established and well delineated ex-
ceptions."1  Most of these exceptions are based upon the necessity of
immediate police action where the requirement of a warrant would
severely hamper effective law enforcement or threaten the safety of
police officials.2 The exception based upon consent has not been so
well delineated although it is settled that it is based not on exigent
circumstances but upon the theory that anyone may cooperate with
law enforcement officials and that such cooperation should be encour-
aged.3 The question of when a consent to search is validly given has
until recently been a matter of dispute among state and federal courts.4
The United States Supreme Court has formulated the test for a
valid consent in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.5 Denying that a defend-
ant's knowledge of his right to withhold consent was a prerequisite for
a valid search, the Court held "that when the subject of a search is
not in custody and the State attempts to justify the search on the basis
of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not
the result of duress or coercion, express or implied."6
Schneckloth involved the search of an automobile based entirely
upon consent. The respondent, Robert Bustamonte, and five com-
panions were stopped by a police officer on routine patrol because of
a nonfunctioning headlight and license plate light. The driver, Joe
Gonzales, failed to produce a valid operator's license and only Joe
Alcala, who explained that the car belonged to his brother, could pro-
duce a license. The officer asked the six occupants to step out of the
car, and after the arrival of two additional officers, he asked Alcala if
he could search the car. Alcala replied, "Sure, go ahead." No one
had been arrested, and the atmosphere was described by the officers and
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chimel v. Cal-
ifornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
3. See text accompanying note 58 infra.
4. Compare, e.g., Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965), and
Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954), with Lucas v. State, 368
S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Crim.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 925 (1963). See also notes 12-13
infra.
5. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
6. Id. at 248-49.
[Vol. 52
CONSENT TO SEARCH
Gonzales as "congenial". Alcala assisted in the search by opening the
trunk of the car. Under the rear seat the officers found three crumpled
checks which had been stolen from a car wash. Only then were the men
arrested.
The respondent was convicted of possession of a check with in-
tent to defraud. The conviction was affirmed on appeal 7 and the
California Supreme Court denied review.8 But the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, vacating a district court's denial of a writ of habeas
corpus, remanded for a determination of whether Alcala had known
of his fourth amendment right to withhold his consent to the search.9
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart,
held that, while the defendant's knowledge of his rights is one of the
facts to be considered, it is not an essential element of an effective
consent. Rather, the determination must focus on the voluntariness of
the consent, considering all the surrounding circumstances. There-
fore, the Court reasoned, the inquiry thought necessary by the court of
appeals was not required.' 0
Prior to Schneckloth there was conflict among the lower courts, as
illustrated by that of the California courts and the Ninth Circuit. The
courts of California applied the voluntariness test as formulated by
Justice Traynor in People v. Michael:" "Whether in a particular case
an apparent consent was in fact voluntarily given or was in submission
to an express or implied assertion of authority, is a question of fact to
be determined in the light of all the circumstances."' 2  This test is
primarily concerned with the actions of the police in eliciting the con-
sent and requires a determination of whether there had been coercion
or duress involved.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, approached the issue by
considering consent a waiver of fourth and fourteenth amendment
rights. This test primarily focused on the state of the defendant's
knowledge. It not only required a showing of voluntariness by the
7. People v. Bustamonte, 270 Cal. App. 2d 648, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1969).
8. The order of the Supreme Court of California is unreported.
9. Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699 (9th Cit. 1971).
10. 412 U.S. at 248-49.
11. 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955).
12. Id. at 753, 290 P.2d at 854; see United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963); United States v. Perez, 242 F.2d 867
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 941 (1957); People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal. App. 3d
1006, 98 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1971); State v. Hauser, 257 NoC. 158, 125 S.E.2d 389 (1962)
(per curiam).
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state but also an affirmative showing that the defendant had knowledge
of his right freely and effectively to withhold his consent. 3
In upholding the California approach, the Court in Schneckloth
adopted the reasoning of cases involving coerced confessions that
were decided prior to Escobedo v. Illinois.14 In those cases the due
process balancing of individual liberty against the security of society
was reached by use of the voluntariness test, that is whether, judging
from the "totality of the circumstances," the confession was "the prod-
uct of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.""
Applying these standards to consent searches, the Court concluded
that the waiver approach of the Ninth Circuit was inappropriate.' 0
This resolution of the conflict has some basis in a few early
cases concerning consent searches, although it was by no means com-
pelled by precedent. The consent search has been recognized at least
since Davis v. United States 7 in which the Court upheld the search
of a gasoline station storeroom on the basis of the defendant's consent.
The Court focused, however, on the public nature of the gas ra-
tioning coupons that were the objects of the search and avoided the ques-
tion of consent in the more usual case of private documents.' 8 Al-
13. "Such a waiver cannot be conclusively presumed from a verbal expression
of assent. The Court must determine from all the circumstances whether the verbal as-
sent reflected an understanding, uncoerced, and unequivocal election to grant the offi-
cers a license which the person knows may be freely and effectively withheld." Ci-
pres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965); see United States v. Mapp,
476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973); Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 865 (1968); Rosenthall v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir.
1968); United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); State v. Witherspoon,
460 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1970). But see Martinez v. United States, 333 F.2d 405 (9th
Cir. 1964).
14. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo marked the initial shift from subjective vol-
untariness to a more objective inquiry into whether the defendant had in fact been ad-
vised of his rights. The shift was completed two years later in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); see text accompanying note 28 infra.
15. 412 U.S. at 225, quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
16. [We cannot accept the position of the Court of Appeals in this case
that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a necessary prereq-
uisite to demonstrating a "voluntary" consent. Rather it is only by analyzing
all the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained
whether in fact it was voluntary or coerced. It is the careful sifting of the
unique facts and circumstances of each case that is evidenced in our prior
decisions involving consent searches.
412 U.S. at 232-33.
17. 328 U.S. 582 (1946). In an earlier case the Court hinted that consent might
be a valid exception to the warrant requirement in some instances when it curtly re-
jected the contention that the consent involved in that case operated as a valid waiver.
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
18. We do not stop to review all of our decisiong which define the scope
of "reasonable" searches and seizures. For they have largely developed out
of cases involving the seizure of private papers. We are dealing here not
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though the Court appeared to examine the surrounding circumstances
and spoke in terms of voluntariness, 19 the precedential value of Davis
proved to be merely in establishing that consent is a valid exception to
the warrant requirement. 20  The standards for determining when a
particular consent is valid were not clearly explained and conse-
quently became a question for lower courts.
In Davis the Court did not refer to the concept of waiver, al-
though this concept had been developed earlier in the context of the
sixth amendment right to counsel. In Johnson v. Zerbst," ' the Court
spoke of the waiver of a constitutional right in general terms. "A
waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege. '22  This standard was accepted and ap-
plied by the Court in areas other than the right to counsel,28 and two
years after Davis the Court invalidated a consent search using the lan-
guage of the waiver standard. In Johnson v. United States24 the Court
said, "It [entry into defendant's hotel room] was granted in submis-
sion to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver
of a constitutional right. '25  The seed for conflict as to the applicable
standard for determining the validity of consent was planted here.
with private papers or documents, but with gasoline rationing coupons which
never became the property of the holder but remained at all times the prop-
erty of the government and subject to inspection and recall by it.
328 U.S. at 587-88.
19. In a companion case the Court upheld a search "consented" to by contract.
The Court held that "those rights [under the fourth and fourteenth amendments] may
be waived. And when petitioner ... specifically agreed to permit inspection of his
accounts and records, he voluntarily waived such claim to privacy which he otherwise
might have had. . . ." Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946).
20. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), is cited by the American Law
Institute for this proposition rather than as authority for the voluntariness test of con-
sent. The Al did not mention Davis but concluded that "voluntariness is not enough;
effective consent requires awareness as well." ALT MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROc EDURE, Commentary at 192 (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL CODE].
21. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
22. Id. at 464.
23. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (speedy trial); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (guilty plea); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968)
(right of confrontation); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (same); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (double jeopardy); Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (jury trial). The right to counsel and the Zerbst waiver
standard were extended in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (post-indict-
ment pre-trial lineup); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1- (1967) (juvenile proceeding).
24. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
25. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 1ohnson was distinguished as involving "im-
plied" consent in a case upholding a search based upon "express" consent which the
court concluded was "knowingly made." United States v. MacLeod, 207 F.2d 853, 856
(7th Cir. 1953).
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That seed did not begin to grow, however, until the mid-Sixties
when the waiver standard was extended to the fifth amendment, which
had long been under the exclusive protection of the voluntariness
test.26  In Miranda v. Arizona27 the privilege against self incrimina-
tion came under the additional protection of the rigid waiver require-
ments.2" A few lower courts almost immediately held that Miranda
compelled application of the waiver standard to consent searches and
that specific warnings of fourth amendment rights were required be-
fore obtaining the consent of a subject.29 Most courts rejected the
proposition that such warnings were required, although some continued
to apply the knowing waiver standard to the fourth amendment."'
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve the conflict
among the courts on this issue in Bumper v. North Carolina."'
The alleged consent was given by the black defendant's sixty-six year-
old grandmother to four white police officers claiming authority to
search under a warrant.32 Conspicuously absent from Mr. Justice Stew-
art's majority opinion was any mention of the word "waiver.""8  In-
stead the majority held the search invalid on the basis of the claim of
authority: "When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify
the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the con-
26. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); see note 14 supra. The shift from
voluntariness to waiver during this period is well illustrated by the Ninth Circuit cases:
Martinez v. United States, 333 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1964) (voluntariness); Cipres v.
United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965) (waiver).
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28. Miranda abandoned "a long history of judicial review of the validity of con-
fessions under the vague and subjective test of the due process clause, substituting there-
for a rigidly specific and objective standard founded on the fifth amendment's self-
incrimination provision." Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v.
Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 130, 133 (1967).
Significantly, the Miranda Court cites Zerbst, noting that it "has always set high
standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights," and that it "re-assert[s]
these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation." 384 U.S. at 475.
29. E.g., United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Moderaki, 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp.
268 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See also Note, 67 COLuM. L. REv., supra note 28.
30. See, e.g., Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 865 (1968). See also Hotis, Search of Motor Vehicles, 73 Dicic. L. Rnv.
363, 416 (1968); Mintz, Search of Premises by Consent, 73 DicK. L. REv. 44, 67
(1968).
Some courts, of course, continued to apply the voluntariness test; e.g., State v.
McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967); State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150
N.W.2d 915 (1967).
31. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
32. The warrant, however, was not used at trial for some unexplained reason,
and the prosecution chose to rely on consent to justify the search. Id. at 546.
33. See Note, Consent and the Constitution After Bumper v. North Carolina, 6
CA.n. W.L. REv. 316 (1970).
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sent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot
be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority. '34 The force of this statement which apparently supported
the voluntariness test, was unfortunately weakened when the Court
added: "When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a
home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has
no right to resist the search."35  This statement has been construed
as a recognition of the applicability of the waiver standard.88
Although Bumper seemed to embrace the voluntariness test of con-
sent, the conflict continued among the courts. In United States v.
Mapp37 the Second Circuit cited Bumper for the proposition that
"[w]here there is coercion there cannot be consent. 38 But the court
went on to require proof of knowledgeable waiver in order to show an
effective consent, citing Johnson v. Zerbst. The court held the search
invalid because, applying the waiver principles, the consent was not
"'unequivocal, specific and intelligently given . . .' [amounting] to
a knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutionally protected rights." 9
Schneckloth presented the opportunity for the Court to clear up
the waiver-voluntariness conflict.40 Since it was apparent that neither
test was compelled by precedent, the major question to be resolved was
whether the voluntariness test or the waiver criteria better implements
the policies of the fourth amendment. The Court did not discuss
the policy considerations underlying the acceptance of voluntariness and
rejection of the waiver standard beyond its general conclusion that
waiver would impair the recognized utility of consent searches.4'
One of the Court's arguments against application of the waiver
standard in Schneckloth was based on its reluctance to require specific
warnings of these rights before any consent search. Although there
are conflicting opinions as to the necessary content of such warnings,42
34. 391 U.S. at 548-49.
35. Id. at 550.
36. "Where the police claim authority to search yet in fact lack such authority,
the subject does not know that he may permissibly refuse them entry, and it is this
lack of knowledge that invalidates the consent." 412 U.S. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing and citing Bumper).
37. 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973). This case was decided while Schneckloth was
before the Supreme Court.
38. Id. at 77.
39. Id.
40. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
41. 412 U.S. at 227-31.
42. One author, after an in-depth analysis of the effects of Miranda on consent
searches, has suggested that a warning should be required as follows:
1974] 649
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the Court decided that any warning would destroy the utility of the
consent search as a law enforcement device by upsetting the "informal
and unstructured conditions" under which the ordinary request to search
is made."
Mr. Justice Marshall, in dissent, disagreed with the Court's con-
clusions as to the effect of a warning. 44 He argued that a decision to
apply the knowing waiver standard to consent searches would not re-
quire that a warning requirement be judicially imposed on the police.
Although the police would be assured of the admissibility of any evi-
You have a right to refuse to allow me to search your home, and if you de-
cide to refuse, I will respect your refusal. If you do decide to let me
search, you won't be able to change your mind later on, and during the
search I'll be able to look in places and take things which I couldn't
even if I could get a search warrant. You have a right to a lawyer be-
fore you decide, and if you can't afford a lawyer we will get you one and
you won't have to pay for him. There are many different laws which are
designed to protect you from my searching, but they are too complicated for
me to explain or for you to understand, so if you think you would like to take
advantage of this very important information, you will need a lawyer to help
you before you tell me I can search.
Note, 67 CoLuM. L. REv., supra note 28, at 158.
Others have been willing to settle for less detail; e.g., "You do not have to consent
to a search of your house, and without your permission, I cannot make any search
without a search warrant." This statement was considered enough in Note, Effective
Consent to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260, 268 (1964). Mr. Justice
Marshall appears to agree that this type of warning is all that is required in order
to show that a person consents "knowingly." See note 44 infra.
MODEL CODE § SS 240.2(2) provides:
Required Warning to Persons Not in Custody or Under Arrest. Before under-
taking a search under the provisions of this Article, an officer present shall
inform the individual whose consent is sought that he is under no obligation
to give such consent and that anything found may be taken and used in evi-
dence.
43. 412 U.S. at 232. The effects of a warning should be considered in the con-
text of what groups of persons are likely to consent without the warning and who
would not consent if warnings were given. One author lists five such groups: (1)
innocent, cooperating citizens, (2) coerced consenters, (3) criminals attempting to
curry favor, believing "the game is up," (4) citizens ignorant of right to refuse, and
(5) guilty persons "attempting to outwit police and divert suspicion." Of these groups,
he concludes that only two will be affected by warnings. The last group may even
be encouraged to consent as a strategic ploy; while group four will be affected by warn-
ings to the extent that "knowledge will merely serve to remove them into another class
of consenters or refusers." Note, 67 COLum. L. REV., supra note 28, at 159-60.
"Perhaps the strongest argument for requiring a warning is that without undue
burden it will, in many cases, avoid confusion . . . . It is considerably less burden-
some-both in terms of the difficulty of giving it and the number of times it will
have to be given-than a warning prior to interrogation." MODEL CODE, Commentary,
at 194.
44. "I doubt that a simple statement by an officer of an individual's right to
refuse consent would do much to alter the informality of the exchange, except to alert
the subject to a fact that he is surely entitled to know." 412 U.S. at 287.
It is significant that the F.B.I. and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
have been giving warnings before obtaining consent "for decades" without apparent dif-
ficulty. MODEL CODE, Commentary, at 195.
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dence seized, as a practical matter, only if a warning were given, he
argued:
It must be emphasized that the decision about informing the sub-
ject of his rights would lie with the officers seeking consent. If
they believed that providing such information would impede their
investigation, they might simply ask for consent, taking the risk
that at some later date the prosecutor would be unable to prove
that the subject knew of his rights or that some other basis for the
search existed. 45
It seems inevitable, however, that warnings would be necessary in
most situations if the waiver standard were applied to consent
searches.46
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the waiver standard had
been applied, "[a]lmost without exception . . . to those rights which
the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to pre-
serve a fair trial. '' 47  It concluded that since the fourth amendment
has "nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of
truth at a criminal trial," 48 the waiver approach would be misplaced in
this context. This conclusion, however, does not withstand analysis.
There are two major policies to be considered in deciding which
of the two standards to apply to any constitutional right. First, there
is the policy of permitting "citizens to choose whether or not they
wish to exercise their constitutional rights." 49  The waiver standard
was formulated to promote this policy by requiring that a defendant
be informed of his constitutional rights before he is allowed to forego
them. Second, there is the policy of preventing coercion of a defendant
in derogation of his constitutional rights. The voluntariness test is pri-
45. 412 U.S. at 287. He concluded that the effect of the Court's opinion would
be to relegate the protection of the fourth amendment to "the sophisticated, the knowl-
edgeable, and. . the few." Id. at 289.
46. "Unless the police undertake some responsibility for advising the person
whose cooperation is sought of his rights,-there are created the same problems of estab-
lishing that a consent to search is 'freely and voluntarily given,' as troubled the courts
with confessions and led to the requirements imposed by Miranda." MODEL CODn,
Commentary, at 193.
47. 412 U.S. at 237.
48. Id. at 242.
49. Id. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), implicitly recognized the importance of this policy. Although osten-
sibly based in terms of preventing coercion, Miranda recognized that the presence of
counsel at interrogations, required under Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
was sufficient to insure that a confession was "not the product of compulsion." 384
U.S. at 466. The warning requirement can be viewed as recognition that the policy
of allowing an intelligent choice is equally as important as dispelling coercion.
1974]
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marily concerned with promoting this policy but the waiver standard
also prevents coercion where it interferes with exercise of free choiceA0
The difference in operation of the two standards can best be shown
by a comparison of the policies of the fourth and fifth amendments.
Although these two amendments have long been recognized as
overlapping and complementing each other,51 there are distinctions;
some are more subtle than their relative importance in ensuring a fair
trial, which is the only one drawn by the Court.5 2  There are no cir-
cumstances under which self incrimination can constitutionally be com-
pelled. The concern of the fifth amendment, then, is with compul-
sion. Logically the voluntariness test was developed in this context to
promote the second policy above. But even in this area of concern
with coercion, the voluntariness test proved unsatisfactory and was
discarded in Miranda. The waiver standard with its concommitant
warnings was substituted, but still with the primary function of pre-
venting the coercion inherent in all custodial interrogations.5 The
first policy is not applicable to a great extent to the fifth amendment
since "no sane person would knowingly relinquish a right to be free
of compulsion." 54
The fourth amendment right to privacy, on the other hand, can
forcibly be invaded whenever the police have probable cause and a
warrant. Since the ordinary consent search takes place in the de-
fendant's familiar surroundings rather than the inherently coercive at-
mosphere of police custody, the coercion problem is less prominent.55
50. "[llt is just as unconstitutional to search after coercing consent as it is to
search after uninformed consent. . . ." 412 U.S. at 282 n.8 (dissenting opinion).
51. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886).
52. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
53. Miranda recognized the importance of the waiver criteria in promoting intelli-
gent choice; see note 49 supra. But the Court's primary concern in Miranda was with
coerced confessions, and the waiver criteria implicit in the warnings related to the
waiver of those rights of which a suspect is informed; not to the waiver of the, right
to be free of compulsion.
54. 412 U.S. at 281 (dissenting opinion).
55. The Court, in Schneckloth, specifically left open the question whether the
waiver standard and warnings are required if consent is obtained from a suspect in
custody. It noted, however, "that other courts have been particularly sensitive to the
heightened possibilities for coercion when the 'consent' to a search was given by a
person in custody." Id. at 240-41 n.29.
The lower courts have disagreed on the validity of in-custody consent. Compare
People v. Garcia, 227 Cal. App. 2d 345, 38 Cal. Rptr. 670, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
949 (1964), and People v. Valdez, 188 Cal. App. 2d 750, 10 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1961),
and State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967), with Channel v. United
States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960), and Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), and State v. Witherspoon, 460 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1970).
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Although the Court points out that a defendant's ignorance of his
fourth amendment rights is one of the factors to be considered under
the voluntariness test,56 it is a weak concession to the first policy above
when the coercion question is the ultimate inquiry.5 7  Since the knowl-
edge factor is not conclusive of "coercion," it is difficult to conceive
of how a defendant who has no knowledge of his fourth amendment
rights and yet who is not coerced under the test, can be said to have
chosen to forego those rights by consenting to a search. Therefore,
the voluntariness test, rejected even in the fifth amendment context
where coercion is the main problem, is surely an ill-fitting transplant
into the fourth amendment.
The Court argued, however, that it is not the policy of the fourth
amendment "to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their
ability in the -apprehension of criminals. '5 8  Obviously the encourage-
ment of citizen cooperation, however, cannot override concern for the
protection of constitutional rights. Police convenience in conducting
searches where there is both -insufficient evidence to constitute prob-
able cause for a warrant and no exigent circumstances which allow
the warrant to be dispensed with, is an important consideration, but
it must not be allowed to deprive citizens of the right to choose whether
to cooperate or to assert their constitutional rights.
As support for its position that consent is not a waiver in
the constitutional sense, the Court argued that the waiver standard
is inconsistent with those cases upholding searches based upon the con-
sent of a third party.59 However, it seems questionable that the recog-
nized validity of third party consent is inconsistent with application of
a waiver standard to a defendant's consent. Such searches are upheld
on the rationale that by entrusting his property so completely to a
third party, the defendant no longer has a justifiable expectation of
privacy in the property and that he "assumes the risk" that the third
The Model Code provides that any in-custody consent is invalid unless Miranda
warnings and fourth amendment warnings were given. MODEL CODE § SS 240.2(3).
56. 412 U.S. at 249.
57. The policy of allowing an intelligent choice seems particularly applicable to
the fourth amendment if it is assumed that an individual is more likely instinctively
to protect the privacy of his thoughts without knowledge of his fifth amendment rights
to such privacy, than he is to protect the privacy of his possessions without knowledge
of protection under the fourth amendment.
58. 412 U.S. at 243, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488
(1971).
59. "lit is inconceivable that the Constitution could countenance the waiver of
a defendant's right to counsel by a third party, 6r that a waiver could be found because
a trial judge reasonably, though mistakenly, believed a defendant had waived his right
to plead not guilty." 412 U.S. at 246.
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party will allow a search.60 Therefore, the defendant cannot assert the
fourth amendment to bar admission of evidence seized in the search,
not because his rights were waived by the third party, but because he
has relinquished his privacy."' The question whether the waiver
standard applies to the consent of the third party as a relinquishment
of his own right to privacy in the property over which he had control
remained unresolved in those cases. 62
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the voluntariness test
for determining the validity of a consent to search is neither required
by precedent nor well suited to the policies of the fourth amendment.
Even so, the practical effects of the Court's decision may not be felt
immediately. However, the use of the consent search device to over-
come the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth amend-
ment is likely to increase. With voluntariness as the test to be used
for challenged searches, it is not difficult to predict that, in many cases,
unsophisticated defendants will be held to have "waived" constitutional
rights, the existence of which they had no knowledge.
WILLIAM R. SAGE
Environmental Law-Rucker v. Willis: Are Impact Statements
for Private Projects That Require Federal Permits an Endan-
gered Species?
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)I has had
a short yet tumultuous history. In declaring a national policy concern-
60. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). This rationale is logical when
read in conjunction with the "right to privacy" approach to the fourth amendment in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61. This approach is consistent with the "misplaced trust" cases in which a de-
fendant is unprotected by the fourth, amendment in his disclosures to a trusted third
party who turns out to be a police informant and who either reports to the police
or simultaneously records or transmits his conversations with the defendant. See, e.g.,
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966).
62. The Supreme Court has not been consistent in -its justification of third party
consents. It initially accepted the rationale that the defendant had made the third
party his agent with "apparent authority" to waive his right to privacy. See Stoner
v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). This "agency" rationale has been thoroughly crit-
icized; see Note, 67 COLUm. L. REv., supra note 28, at 48-50; Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv.,
supra note 42, at 272-77. See generally Hotis, supra note 30, at 417-20; Mintz, supra
note 30, at 49-50; Scurlock, Basic Principles of the Administration of Criminal Justice
with Particular Reference to Missouri Law, 38 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 167, 205-06 (1970).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
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